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By Jms T. Bm wAN°
TOdate 26 ]urisdictions1 have passed legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination m employment because of age.2 Among them are the im-
portant industrial states of California, Michigan, New York, Pennsyl-
vama, and Ohio. While the purpose of these statutes is to outlaw
discrimination in employment because of age, the statutes often do
not contain the word "Discrnmation."3 However, the concept of dis-
crinmation seems inherent in the statutory language. Many read some-
thing like:
It shall be an unfair employment practice (a) for an employer, by
himself or his agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational
qualification or need, because of the race, color, religious creed, age,
national ongm or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or em-
ploy or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or todiscrimiate against hin n compensation or m terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.4
Hence, it would appear from the wording of such statutes that every
consideration of age in the context of the employment relationship is
unlawful, unless, of course, the statute is inapplicable in the specific
case between the particular employer and employee because of ex-
emptions or exclusions contained within the act.5 Even in the absence
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse Uiversity.
I Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin.
2 The best single source for locating material on legislation prohibiting discnimia-
tion in employment because of age is the new CCH Employment Practices Guide.
3 See, e.g., CAL. UsN m. INs. CODE: § 2072. Compare AL.sKA STAT. § 23.10.192
(Supp. 1966).
4 CoN. GEN,. STAT. REV. § 31-126 (1962). The corresponding California statutory
section prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age is CAL. UruNE . INs.
CODE § 2072 which provides: 'It is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hre or em-
ploy; or to discharge, dismiss, reduce, suspend, or demote any individual between the
ages of 40 and 64 solely on the ground of age, except in cases where the law compels
or provides for such action."
5 CAL. UNEMP. INs. CODE § 2072 continues: "'This section shall not be construed to
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of an applicable statutory exemption, a court may construe the statute
as not barring all consideration of age, but rather as merely prohibit-
nig discrimination against an individual because of his age, there
being no violation of such a statute where a bona fide occupational
need exists for using age as a criteria in the employment relationship. 6
Since 1934, Louisiana has prohibited discrimination in employment
because of age.7 There is no specific exclusion for a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification or need; but in interpreting the statute, the at-
torney general issued the opinion that the practice of the Public
Service in New Orleans of requiring bus drivers to be between the
ages of 21 and 45 years did not violate the statute because the drivers
of the motor vehicles are engaged m a hazardous occupation.8 This
opinion appears to factually create an exemption for a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification or need under the statute. Today, a court
might or might not similarly write an exclusion for bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications or needs into a Fair Employment Practice Act; and
even if it did, it might reach a different conclusion as to whether the
the facts in the particular case constituted a bona fide occupational
need or qualification."
make unlawful the rejection or termination of employment where the individual appli-
cant or employee failed to meet bona fide requirements for the job or position sought
or held, or to affect bona fide retirement or pension programs; nor shall this section
preclude such physical and medical examinations of applicants and employees as an
employer may make or have made to determine fitness for the job or position sought
or held.
"Promotions within the existing staff, hiring or promotion on the basis of experience
and training, rehiring on the basis of seniority and prior service with the employer, or
hiring under an established recruiting program from high schools, colleges, universities
and trade schools shall not, in and of themselves, constitute a violation of this chapter.
"Tls section shall not limit the right of an employer, employment agency, or labor
union to select or refer the better qualified person from among all applicants for a job.
The burden of proving a violation of this section shall be upon the person or persons
claiming that the violation occurred."
6 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
7 LA. Ri v. STAT. § 23:892 (1950) provides: "The elements for employment shall
not be determined by age, but shall be governed by the mental and physical fitness,
and by the experience and trustworthiness of the employee or applicant; except in
hazardous occupations or occupations requiring unusual skill and endurance:"
s 1944-146 Ops. LA. ATr'y GEzr. 319.
9 For an example of the interesting problems which laws banning discrimination in
employment because of age may present, the reader might consult a policy statement of
the Washington State Board Against Discrimination issued on November 18, 1965, and
reported in CCH 1966 EwMLoYmENT PRAcncIs Gu E IT 8034: "This Board responds
'no' to the question raised by counsel for the complainants in Smith and Strzeleckt v.
New Viceroy Restaurant, No. EA-963 and -964:-Is an employer requirement that a
cocktail waitress be 'sexy' and exciting violative of the law against discrimination in
employment because of age? "
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It should be pointed out that in almost all states it is not discrimma-
tion because of age which is outlawed but rather discrimination be-
cause of middle age. Persons between the ages of 40 and 65 are gener-
ally singled out exclusively for special protection under the FEP Acts."°
Although there are numerous variations in the several FEP Acts,
the state statutes which prohibit discrimination in employment be-
cause of age may quite usefully be segregated into two distinct groups
according to the scope of the statute. In the first group of statutes
the prohibition against discrimination in employment because of age
is included in a general civil rights statute prohibiting discrimination
in employment because of race, color, religious creed, national origin
or ancestry " The second group of statutes deals exclusively with
discrimination in employment because of age.'2
With a few exceptions,' 3 the legislation prohibiting discrimination
in employment because of age is new ' Many statutes which forbid
The Board said in part: "None of the foregoing 3ob specifications are perfectly
correlated with age, nor is a requirement of sexiness. Some older women are 'sexy'
and some younger women are not. Thus a condition of employment that cocktail wait-
resses be 'sexy' is not strictly an age condition, although it is a condition that older
women, as a class, may find more difficult to meet.
"In any event employees of this Board for the foreseeable future will not question
the employer's ]udgment as to whether a particular girl has the right quantum of sex;
that is not a function of this Board. Any limit on cocktail waitresses m terms of chrono-
logical age will be considered evidence that the cocktail lounge is discriminating be-
cause of age.
"This statement concerns cocktail waitresses only. It does not relate to waitresses
in dining rooms."
1o See text at notes 45, 46, 47, 48 infra. California for example provides: 'It is un-
lawful for an employer to refuse to hire any individual between the ages of 40
and 64 solely on the ground of age " CAL. UNENM. INs. CODE § 2072.
31 Ai.A sH STAT. § 18.80.200 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. 9 31-126
(1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 710 (Supp. 1964); HAWAU REv. LAws § 90A-1
(Supp. 1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 861 (Supp. 1966); MASs. GEN. LAWs
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (1965); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3a) (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18:25-12 (West 1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1966); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 659.024 (Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (1964); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (Supp. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1962); Wis. STAT.
§ 111.31 (1965).
12 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2070-78; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-11-16-17
(1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-1601-06 (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2318-28
(1965); LA. REv. STAT. § 23:893 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 78-80 (1964);
MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 149, §§ 24A-J (1965); Montana House Joint Resolution
No. 12, Laws of 1961, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1001-06 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965); Omao l~v. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1965); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§ 28-6-1-21 (Supp. 1965); TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-14 (Supp.
f966); WAH. REv. CODE § 49.44.090 (1962).
13 Colorado (1903), Louisiana (1934) and Massachusetts (1937 and 1950).
1 4 Az.AsKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (Supp. 1966) (amended to include age in 1965);
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discrimiation in employment because of race, color, religious creed,
national origin or ancestry have recently been amended to prohibit
discrimination because of middle age as well.-5 Likewise, those statu-
tory enactments which only prohibit discrimination in employment
because of age are of recent origin. 6 Three states, Louisiana, North
Dakota and Texas, prohibit discrimination in employment because of
age but do not prohibit discrimination in employment because of race,
color, religious creed, national origin or ancestry 17
The statutes may also be divided into those which provide for
criminal penalties' s and those which provide for specific orders to
hire, promote or re-employ an individual who has been discriminated
against. 19 Some statutes create a special administrative agency charged
with effectuating the purposes of the FEP Act,2 0 and these statutes
usually create a special hearing tribunal to decide cases of alleged
CAL. UNimTn,. INs. CODE § 2072 (enacted m 1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126
(1962) (amended to include age in 1959); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 710 (Supp. 1964)
(became effective in 1960); HAwAI REv. LAws § 90A-1 (Supp. 1963) (enacted in
1963); IDrAo CODE ANN. § 44-1602 (Supp. 1965) (enacted in 1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 40-2318 (1965) (enacted in 1965); ME. 1Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 861 (Supp. 1966)
(enacted in 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 78 (1964) (enacted in 1964); Mica.
STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3a) (Supp. 1965) (amended to include age in 1965); Montana
House Joint Resolution No. 12, Laws of 1961, NEa. REv. STAT. § 48-1004 (West Supp.
1965) (enacted in 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-12 (1964) (amended to include age
in 1962); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (amended to include age in
1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965) (enacted in 1965); Oio REV. CODE
Ar. § 4101.17 (Page 1965) (became effective in 1961); Orx. 1Ev. STAT. § 659.024
(Supp. 1965) (enacted in 1959); PxNN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (1964) (enacted in
1955); P.R. LA S ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (Supp. 1964) (enacted in 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 28-6-2 (Supp. 1965) (enacted in 1956); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-14
(Supp. 1966) (enacted in 1963); WAsH. 1 Ev. CODE § 49.60.180 (1962) (amended to
include age in 1961); Wis. STAT. § 111.31 (1965) (amended to include age in 1959).
15 See amended statutes in note 14 supra.
16For example the Texas statute was passed in the legislative session of 1962-1963,
and the North Dakota statute was enacted in 1965.
'
T However, both North Dakota and Texas have equal pay laws, though the Texas
equal pay law is limited to public employment.
18 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965) which provides: "Any
person or corporation who violates any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed twenty-five dollars
or by imprisonment in the county jail for not to exceed one day or by both such fine and
imprisonment."
19 See, e.g., ALAsXA STAT. § 18.80.130(a) 1 (Supp. 1966) which provides: "[T]he
Commision may order the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of an employee with or
without back pay, restoration to membership in a labor organzation, or his admission to
or participation in an apprenticeship training program, on-the-job training program or
other retraining program."20 See, e.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 18.80.010 (Supp. 1966) which provides for the creation
of a State Commission for Human Rights.
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discrminnation in employment.21 Other statutes do not provide any
sanction for discrimination because of age.
22
As a rule the statutes which prohibit discrimnation in employment
only because of age and winch are not modeled after a general civil
rights statute provide either criminal sanctions or no sanctions what-
ever.23 The statutes which include age in a general civil rights act
normally provide for: (1) specific orders to hire, promote, or re-
employ; (2) an administrative agency to enforce the act; and (3) a
special hearing tribunal to determine cases of alleged discrimination
under the act.24
What Constitutes a Violation of the FEP Acts
Types of Discrimination Because of Age
Most acts provide in substance that it is an unfair employment
practice for an employer to refuse to hire a person,25 discrimmate
against an individual in the employment relationship, 26 or discharge 27
an employee because of his age. Thus there are three distinct types of
cases in which the employer may be guilty of violating the FEP Acts.
The employer may discriminate against an individual in the hiring
process. After he has hired the individual, the employer may dis-
crimmate against the worker while he is an employee. And finally, the
employer may discriminate against an individual by discharging him.
Discrimination in Hiring
It is obvious that the FEP Acts prohibit discrminnation against an
individual at the hiring stage, The statute usually will provide:
21 See, e.g., CoNN. GEaN. STAT. REV. §§ 31-124, 31-127 (1962) wich provide for
the appointment of hearing examiners and set forth the procedure under which a com-
plaint is brought before a hearing tribunal.22 For example, California provides no penalty for violating CAL. UNEMN,. INS. CoDE
§ 2072. Also, there is no penalty provided in TEX. BEV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-14
(Supp. 1966).
23 See, e.g., LA. Rv. STAT. § 23:893 (1950) which provides: "Whoever violates
the provision of this Section shall be fined no more than five hundred dollars or im-
prisoned for not more than ninety days, or both."
2 4 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-127 (1962).
25 For example it is unlawful in California to refuse to hire any individual between
the ages of 40 and 64 solely on the ground of age. CAL. UNEmp. INs. CODE § 2072.
26 For example California makes it unlawful to reduce or suspend any individual
between the ages of 40 and 64 solely on the ground of age. CAL. Ua -mN,. INs. CODE
§ 2072. Az.AsKA STAT. § 18.80.130 (Supp. 1966) provides that the Commissioner shall
order a person to refrain from engaging in discriminatory conduct. The order may pre-
scribe conditions on the accused's future conduct. The Commissioner may order up-
grading of an employee with or without back pay or Is admission to or participation
in apprenticeship, on-the-]ob, or retraining programs.
2 7 E.g., CAL. UNENM. INs. CODE, § 2072.
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It shall be an unfair employment practice (a) for an employer, by
himself or his agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational
qualification or need, because of the race, color, religious creed, age,
national origin or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or em-
ploy or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to
discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment...28
The administrative agencies charged with the enforcement of the
acts consistently interpret this statutory language to prohibit any act
which may lead to an ultimate discriminatory refusal to hire. Thus an
employer may not advertise a position by a description which excludes
middle-aged applicants,2 9 recruit in such a manner as to discriminate
against a middle-aged mdividual,30 or discriminate against a middle-
aged person by offering to pay him a lower salary because of his
age.31
Discrimination During the Employment Relationship
After an individual has been hired, the FEP Acts prohibit dis-
crunination in the employment relationship. 2 It is unlawful to pay
a middle-aged employee less because of his age,3 but it is not unlawful
to treat the middle-aged employee unequally as to pension plans and
similar fringe benefits.3 4 Likewise, the failure to promote, or give
special training opportunities to a middle-aged employee because of
his age, and discrinnation against a middle-aged employee in the
type of work to winch he is assigned are prohibited under the FEP
Acts.3 5
2 8 CONN. GEN. STAT. R . § 31-126 (1962).
29 For example Regulation § 371-2a of the Connecticut Comm sion on Civil Rights
provides: "It shall be an unfair employment practice, except in the case of a bona fide
occupational qualification or need, for employers or newspapers to use in employment
advertising the word 'young' in describing an applicant or to use an age specification or
limitation which bars applicants over a maxnnum age e.g. 'Help Wanted 25 to 35' 'Help
Wanted Under 40"' Found in CCH 1966 EuMLOYmENT PnAcrTcx GumE. 9 21276.
30 E.g., PzNx. STAT. Aix. tit. 43, § 955(b) 4 (1964).
81 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126(a) (1962).
3 2 E.g., ALAsrA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1966).
33 E.g., CoNx. GrN. STAT. REv. § 31-126(a) (1962).
34 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126 (Supp. 1965) provides: "[T]he provisions
of this section as to age shall not apply to (1) termination of employment where the
employee is thereupon entitled to benefits under the terms or conditions of any bona fide
retirement or pension plan or collective bargaining agreement between the employer and
a bona fide labor organization, (2) operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide
retirement or pension plan, (3) operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide
group or employee insurance plan35E.g., ALAsx& STAT. §§ 18.80.130, 18.80.220 (Supp. 1966).
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The Discriminatory Discharge
The FEP Acts make it unlawful to discharge an employee because
of his age. 8 However, if the discharge is the result of a bona fide pen-
sion or retirement plan, it will not Violate the acts, which specifically
provide an exemption for such plans. And since age is generally
defined in the FEP Acts as being between 40 and 65,38 it would not
violate the acts to discharge an employee over 65 because of his age.
Discrimination by Agents of the Employer
Once it is determined that consideration of age violates the FEP
Act, a related question is who must have unlawfully considered the-
individual's age to hold the employer liable for violating the statute?
The answer is simple when only one man does the hiring, but it is
more difficult to answer the question with fairness both to the appli-
cant and the employer when the views of several screening personnel
are submitted to a person with final hiring authority Will unlawful
consideration of age in the part of one of the screening personnel, with
or without submission of the candidate's age to the person authorized
to dW the hiring, constitute an unlawful employment practice on the
part of the employer? 39 In a recent Connecticut case, where a whole
board had the final hiring authority, the court held that the unlawful
consideration of age by one member of the board did not constitute a
violation of the statute.40
30 See report of J. Edward Conway on the practices of the airlines in setting an age
ceiling for continued employment as a stewardess reported in CCH 1966 EwmLOmhENT
PnAcmcs Gum. g 8051. He found that such a ceiling was not a bona fide occupational
qualification under the New York state law against discrmmation.
37 Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
38 E.g., CoNN. GENi. STAT. REV. § 31-122(k) (1962) defines age as meaning "any
age between forty and sixty five, inclusive." Califorma's statute covers individuals be-
tween the ages of 40 and 64. CAL. Uunlw. INS. CoDE § 2072.
39 To date these questions appear to be unanswered. The author submits that any
unlawful consideration of age by any agent of an employer winch adversely affected an
applicant would probably constitute a violation of the FEP Act by the employer.
40 Board of Educ. v. Commission on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 652, 220 A.2d 278
(1966). At a meeting of the West Haven Board of Education one of the members,
Mr. Dest, remarked that Steeves [the complainant] was fifty years of age and that he
wanted a young man to be trained as a potential administrator in this position. After a
forty-five minute discussion, the motion to appoint the complainant to the position was
put to a vote and defeated four to two. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors said
"The reference to Steeves' age by Dest appears to have been taken out of context by
the majority of the hearing tribunal and to have been given undue weight in arriving at
their decision. Had age been a factor in motivating Dest's vote, the record fails to sup-
port, let alone prove, that the other three members who voted against Steeves were
similarly motivated. The isolated observation of one member cannot be imputed to his
March, 1967]
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Discrimination by Nonemployers
Although the employer is the party who is most likely to violate
the FEP Acts, the acts may be violated by other individuals or or-
ganzations as well. It is quite possible for a union to violate the FEP
Acts both within its own organizaton41 and m conjunction with an
employer.42 Third parties such as employment agencies 3 and others44
may also violate the FEP Acts by their activities.
Exemptions and Exclusions
Minimum and Maximum Age
As previously pointed out, the statutes of most states do not pro-
hibit discrimination in employment because of age against persons
under 40 or over 65.1r
It is difficult to perceive the justification for excluding workers
under 40 from the protection of the statutes. Indeed, some states do
not.4" Probably it was believed by legislators that young workers were
not being discriminated against because of their age and, hence,
needed no such protection. But surely, if a younger worker is dis-
crimmated against because of his age, he should be entitled to the
same protection as his middle-aged brother. And indeed, it is believed
that certain organizations, particularly industries such as banking, do
discriminate against younger employees.
colleagues on the board as the reason for the board's action. See Mrowka v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 149, 154, 55 A.2d 909." Id. at 658, 220 A.2d at 281.
43E.g., AI.Asn STAT. § 18.80.220(2) (Supp. 1966) provides: "It is unlawful for a
labor organization, because of a person's age, race, religion, color or national origin, to
exclude or to expel him from its memberslip, or to discriminate in any way against one
of its members or an employer or an employee."42 E.g., ALA sA STAT. § 18.80.260 (Supp. 1966) provides: "It is unlawful for a
person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of an act forbidden under this
chapter or to attempt to do so."
43 See, e.g., Ax.AsK STAT. § 18.80.220(3) (Supp. 1966)" 'It is unlawful for an
employer or employment agency to print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated
a statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use a form of application for employ-
ment or to make an inqury in connection with prospective employment, which ex-
presses, directly or indirectly, a limitation, specification or discrimination as to age,
race, creed, color or national origin, or an intent to make the limitation, unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification."
44 See statute quoted in note 42 supra. It would appear that newspapers may violate
the FEP Acts by printing advertisements which by their content constitute a violation
of the acts.
45 See, e.g., Im. ANN. STAT. § 40-2318 (1965). However, several states cover
slightly different age spans in their acts.
46 For example, Idaho protects all workers under 60. ITAno CODE ANN. § 44-1602
(Supp. 1965). New Jersey fails to limit age in its law against discrinnation. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18:25-5 (West 1964).
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The reason for excluding workers over 65 from the protection of
the acts is the practical necessity of some cut off age, and 65 is the
traditional retirement age in America. While many persons over 65
are capable of performing in accordance with what may be termed as
the minimum economic standard required by industry, many are not;
and almost all persons over 85 are not. If a cut off age were not
contained in the statutes,47 the burden of proving"' that a 68-year-old
employee was not satisfactorily fulfilling the requirements of his posi-
tion would be extremely difficult. The absence of a cut off age is a
disadvantage to employers because in each individual case all the
emotional factors are in favor of the employee and against the em-
ployer.
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification or Need
Generally, the FEP Acts prohibit discrimination in employment
because of age, unless based upon a bona fde occupational qualifica-
tion or need.49 The difficulty is determining what is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification or need in the circumstances which give rise
to a dispute. Though the exemption is necessarily broad, it could be
defined either by examples or general rules. To date, however, no
administrative agency charged with drafting regulations to supple-
ment the FEP Acts has attempted to define "bona fide occupational
qualification" by example or otherwise. Likewise, no court of record
has yet passed on what constitutes a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion or need."" It is not clear whether the courts will interpret the
words "qualification or need" as being synonymous or as having dif-
ferent meanings.
Occupational Qualification
This exemption should permit the employer to set minimum stand-
ards of educational and professional experience without violating the
FEP Acts. However, if a middle-aged individual meets these minimum
occupational qualifications,"' the employer might violate the acts if
47 New Jersey apparently has no cut-off age. See note 46 supra.
48 See text at note 85 tnfra concerning the burden of proof under the FEP Acts.
49 The ita]icized phrase is taken from CoNtr. GExr. STAT. REv. § 31-126(a) and ap-
pears m many of the FEP Acts. The idea but not the language is found in CAL. UNEMP,.
INS. CODE § 2072.50 In Board of Educ. v. Commission on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 652, 220 A.2d 278
(1966) this issue was briefed, but the case was decided on other grounds. See note 40
supra.
51 In refusing to grant a railroad company and a tree trimming firm a blanket ex-
emption from the Age Discrimination Act, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission said:
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he were to select a younger man for a specific job, raise or promotion
because the man was younger, 2 regardless of what additional ad-
vantages might accrue to the employer by giving the younger man
the job, raise or promotion. 3
Occupational Need
If the acts were read to exclude discrimination based upon a bona
fide occupational need of the employer, it does not appear that such
an interpretation would permit any additional consideration of age
which would not be permitted under the concept of a bona fide
occupational qualification. This is because of the meaning of the
adjective "occupational." Occupation relates to generally recognized
classifications of skills.5" Hence, bona fide occupational qualification
and bona fide occupational need would for practical purposes be
synonymous. Neither phrase would permit the employer to discrim-
mate against a middle-aged worker because the employer desired or
needed a younger individual in the position.
Bona Fide Need
If the courts should read the phrase "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation or need" so that only "bona fide" modifies "need," then an ad-
ditional and important exemption to the acts would exist. Such an
interpretation would permit an employer to deliberately select a
younger man over an older man for a position or promotion whenever
it might legitimately be in the best interests of the employer to have
a younger man in the position. Such an interpretation would cer-
tamly permit management training programs. (In the absence of an
exemption for the bona fide needs of an employer, management train-
ing programs quite likely violate the FEP Acts of many states.) The
requirement that there be a bona fide need for a younger man on the
part of the employer would prohibit general policies by employers
such as only hiring young men as salesmen, but it would permit an
employer with an almost exclusively middle-aged sales staff to de-
liberately hire a few younger salesmen m order to secure the future
continuity of the business upon the gradual retirement of the older
salesmen.
"The ability of a yard man to hop onto a freight or a trimmer to climb trees is not
necessarily governed by his age." CCH 1966 EMPLoYmNT PeLcEs GuiDE f[ 8059.52 See, e.g., CAL. UNEmp. INs. CoDE § 2072; Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(1) (1965).
53 This is a debatable point which only litigation will resolve. See note 36 supra.
54This point is arguable. One meaning of occupation is one's habitual employment,
trade or calling. Hence any skill required for any job could also be regarded as a bona
fide occupational qualification or need.
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Apprenticeship Programs
Generally, the FEP Acts provide an exemption in favor of ap-
prenticeship programs.55 This exemption should apply to all com-
monly recognized classifications of skilled worker apprenticeship
programs, and probably it should apply to newly instituted apprentice-
ship-like programs which are required for the newly developed skilled
]obs of American industry In light of the types of jobs available in our
Twentieth Century society, it would be possible for the courts to give
the word "apprenticeship" a new meaning so as to include all train-
ing programs, such as training programs for salesmen, clerical per-
sonnel, juior executives, etc. Similarly, the courts might exempt
management training programs from the FEP Acts by classifying these
programs as executive apprenticeships. Such expansion of the con-
cept of apprenticeship, while arguably desirable on broad grounds of
social policy, seem unlikely because too great an expansion of this
exemption would for practical purposes abrogate the statutory pro-
hibition of discrimination against the middle-aged. That is, it would
defeat the intent of the state legislatures in passing this legislation.
Religious, Fraternal and Charitable Organizations
The states which include prohibition of discrimination because of
age in a general civil rights statute generally exempt religious, fraternal
and charitable organizatons from the statute.5 6 This exclusion of re-
ligions, fraternal and charitable organizations is probably too broad
even in the context of discrimination because of race, color, national
origin or ancestry What legitimate social interest is protected by
permitting hospitals or like institutions to discriminate in employment
because of race? Such an exemption serves no apparent socially useful
purpose when the basis for this discrimination is not race but merely
age. It unjustifiably exempts an important group of employers from
the requirement to treat middle-aged workers equally with younger
workers.
55 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126 (Supp. 1965) provides: "The provisions
of this section as to age shall not apply to operation of any bona fide apprenticeship
system or plan."56 AiAS.x& STAT. § 18.80.300(3) (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2318 (1965);
MD. ANN. CoDE art. 100, § 79(b) (1964); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 1
(1965); N.J. STAT. Aim. § 18:25-5(e) (West 1964); ORE. Bzv. STAT. § 659.010(6)
(Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (1964); R.I. Gm. LAws ANN.
§ 28-6-1 (Supp. 1965). The Alaska statute defines employer as "an employer of one or
more persons m the state but does not include a club that is exclusively social, or a
fraternal, charitable, educational, or religious association or corporation, if the club, asso-




The states which prohibit discrimmation because of age m the
same statute which prohibits discrimination because of race or religion
usually provide an exclusion for domestic servants.5 7 This exclusion
may be justified when the race and possibly when religion is the basis
for the discrimmation since society's interest m permitting every
individual to associate with whom he pleases outweighs the social evil
of discrimination, but there is no apparent social justification for
excluding domestic employees from protection against discrimination
in employment because of their age. Indeed, domestic employment is
one type of work which middle-aged and older persons are quite quali-
fied to do. Age can make little legitimate difference to the employer
of a domestic servant so long as the employee is capable of perform-
ing his job satisfactorily This unfortunate exclusion is a result of the
statutory scheme of many states which unjustifiably includes age along
with race or religion in a general civil rights statute.
Fringe Benefits
Today employees are compensated not only m cash wages but
also by employer contributions to pension plans, life insurance, health
insurance and the like. Even under group plans, the cost of the con-
tributions by the employer to these plans may increase with the age
of the employee. Thus in real hard cash terms it may be more ex-
pensive for an employer to hire an older worker than a younger man.
While this should not be a reason for permitting an employer not to
hire a job applicant because of his age, it should be permissible for an
employer to adjust the salary offered to older job applicants so that
his total economic cost for a worker to fill the position will not be
increased by the hiring of an older man for the position.58
57 ALxASA STAT. § 18.80.300(2) (Supp. 1966); CAL. UNEN:P. INS. CODE § 2071(3);
Coirur. GEx. STAT. Rv. § 31-122(g) (1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2327 (1965); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 149, § 241, 151B, § 1 (1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(2) c
(1960); N.J. STAT. Aiw. § 18:25-5(f) (West 1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(6)
(McKinney 1951); OnE. REv. STAT. § 659.010(5) (Supp. 1965); I'.x . STAT. Aim.
tit. 43, § 954(c).
58 See IND. AN. STAT. § 40-2328 (1965) which provides: 'Nothmg herein shall
be deemed to limit, restrict or affect the freedom of any employer in regard to (a) fix-
ing compulsory retirement requirements for any class of employees at an age or ages
less than sixty-five [65] years; (b) fixing eligibility requirements for participation in,
or enjoyment by employees of, benefits under any annuity plan or pension or retirement
plan on the basis that any employee may be excluded from eligibility therefor who, at
the time he would otherwise become eligible for such benefits, is older than, the age
fixed in such eligibility requirements or (c) keeping age records for any such purposes."
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Likewise many employers have compulsory retirement ages com-
bined with pension benefits. While it may well be that compulsory
retirement programs should be regarded as against sound public
policy,"" it is clear that any legislation prohibiting compulsory retire-
ment programs would face violent political opposition both from or-
ganized labor and management. Hence many of the FEP Acts clearly
exclude such compulsory retirement plans from the coverage of the
act.s0 As indicated previously61 the age span protected by the acts
will also frequently exclude from the coverage of the acts persons
who would otherwise be required to retire.
Employers of X Number of Persons
The states which include prohibition of discrimination because of
age m their general civil rights statutes usually provide an exemption
for employers of a very limited number of persons.6 2 Frequently this
exemption is created by defining an employer as a person employing
more than X number of employees. 3 The exact number varies from
state to state but is always small. The purpose of this exemption in
terms of discrimination because of race or religion is to preserve the
freedom of the employer to indulge in his personal prejudices in
selecting employees with whom he will be in intimate contact. While
it may be socilly desirable not to force an employer into personal
59 See CAL. UNzwzn. INs. CODE § 2070 which proclaims: "It is the public policy of
the State of Califorma that manpower should be used to its fullest extent. This state-
ment of policy compels the further conclusion that human beings seeking employment,
or retention thereof, should be judged fairly and without resort to rigid and unsound
rules that operate to disqualify significant portions of the population from gainful and
useful employment. Accordingly, use by employers, employment agencies, and labor
organizations of arbitrary and unreasonable rules which bar or terminate employment
on the ground of age offend the public policy of this State." However, CAL. UNEUP.
INS. CODE § 2072 provides: "This section shall not be construed to make unlawful the
rejection or termination of employment where the individual applicant or employee
failed to meet bona fide requirements for the job or position sought or held, or to affect
bona fide retirement or pension programs. "
60 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2327-28 (1965). Section 40-2328 is quoted note
58 supra. Section 40-2327 reads: "These provisions shall not apply to a person employed
in private domestic service or service as a farm laborer nor to a person who is qualified
for benefits under the terms or conditions of an employer retirement or pension plan or
system."
61 See text at notes 47, 48 supra.
62 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-122(f) (1962) provides an exemption for
employers of four or fewer employees.
03 .E.g., MIcIs. STAT. AaNN. § 17.458(2)b (1960) provides: "The term 'employer'
includes the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof, any person employing 8
or more persons within the state and any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly."
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contacts with races or religions which he finds obnoxious, certainly
no one would suggest that socially unacceptable hostility is likely
to develop between an employer and an employee simply because
the employee is old or young. The different bases of the two reasons
for discrimination indicate why FEP restrictions barring discrimmation
based upon age should not be lumped with those which deal with
discrimination based upon religion or race.
States which have separate legislation banning discrimination be-
cause of age are not likely to have such an exemption for employers
of a limited number of individuals."'
Procedure Under the FEP Acts
As previously noted, the statutes prohibiting discrimmation in em-
ployment because of age fall into two groups. The first group merely
makes such discrimination unlawful, but it neither establishes an
administrative agency to see that the act is complied with nor does it
establish special tribunals to determine whether or not an alleged
act of discrimination occurred.65 These activities are left to appropriate
existing state officials and the regular courts. Since these statutes are
generally crimmal in nature, there are few major procedural or sub-
stantive difficulties encountered, and the normal court procedure is
followed.
The second group of statutes not only makes discrimination in
employment unlawful, but it charges an administrative agency with
power to enforce the statute.6  The administrative agency is authorized
to investigate 7 and initiate the prosecution of alleged violations.66 The
agency may also be authorized to issue regulations to supplement the
act. 9 Special hearing tribunals are established for an administrative
64 E.g., Inno CODE ANx. §§ 44-1601-06 (Supp. 1965).
85E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 23:893 (1950); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp.
1965).
66 E.g., Mica. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(6) (1960). The Michigan Civil Rights Com-
mission was established by a constitutional amendment and has replaced the state's Fair
Employment Practices Commission as guardian against discrimination. Mica. STAT.
ANN. § 3.548(6) (Supp. 1965).
O7E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2312(e) (1965); CoNN. Em. STAT. REv. § 31-
125(e) (1962).
6 8 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-127 (Supp. 1965) provides in part: 'In case
of failure to eliminate such practice, the investigator or investigating commissioner shall
certify the complaint and the results of his investigation to the chairman of the com-
mission and to the attorney general. The chairman of the commission shall thereupon
appoint a hearing tribunal of three members of the commission or a panel of hearing
examiners to hear such complaint and shall cause to be issued and served in the name
of the commission a written notice, together with a copy of such complamt, as the
same may have been amended, requiring the person, employer, labor organization or
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determination of whether or not an employer has discriminated
against an individual m the particular circumstances giving rise to
the dispute. 70
Prehearing Procedure
In the states where a special procedure exists for handling com-
plaints of alleged discrimination, the following procedure is typical.
First a complaint must be fied by the aggrieved individual with the
appropriate administrative agency 71 It is then the agency's task to in-
vestigate and determine whether or not probable cause exists to
believe that discrimination because of age has occurred. Until the
employer is contacted, the only information the agency has is the
charge by the aggrieved mdividual. Hence, unless the complainant is
not within the age group protected by the statute, a prima facie case
of discrimiation exists against the employer. It is doubtful whether
in most cases a mere denial by the employer will be accepted by the
agency as sufficient to dispose of the complaint, and so even at this
early stage in the proceedings, the burden is on the employer to prove
to the satisfaction of the agency that he did not discriminate against
the complainant. If the agency is not satisfied, then in most states it
has the authority to seek and obtain voluntary compliance by the
employer with the FEP Act.7" This means that the agency attempts to
employment agency named in such complaint, hereinafter referred to as the respondent,
to answer the charges of such complaint at a hearng before such tribunal, at a time
and place to be specified in such notice. The place of any such hearing may be the
office of the commission or another place designated by it. The case in support of the
complaint shall be presented at the hearing by the attorney general, who shall be
counsel for the commission; and no commissioner who previously made the investiga-
tion or caused the notice to be issued shall participate in the hearing except as a wit-
ness, nor shall he participate in the deliberations of the tribunal in such case."
69 E.g., CoN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-125(c) (1962) provides the commission with
the power: "to adopt, publish, amend and rescind regulations consistent with and to
effectuate the provisions of this chapter."
70 See note 68 supra.
7 1 Ax.Asxi. STAT. § 18.80.100 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. BRE. § 31-127
(1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (Supp. 1964); HAA wi BEv. LAws § 90A-3
(Supp. 1963); IDAo CODE ANN. § 40-1603 (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2322
(1965); ME. Ezv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 863 (Supp. 1966); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
151B, § 5 (1965); MIcH. STAT. ANw. § 17.458(7) (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-13
(West 1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297(1) (McKinney Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 659.040 (Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. AN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964); R.I. GEN. LWS AN.
§ 28-6-7 (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. § 111.36(1) (1965).
7 2 AsxA STAT. § 18.80.120 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-127
(1962); HAwAn REv. LAWS § 90A-2 (Supp. 1963); IDAnO CODE Aim. § 40-1603
(Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2323 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAws Amr. ch. 151B,
§ 5 (1965); MICn. STAT. AbN. § 17.458(7) (1960); N.J. STAT. A.N. § 18:25-14 (West
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persuade the employer to voluntarily employ the complainant in the
position which the complainant claims by right he would have received
if he had not been discriminated against because of Ins age. If the
agency is unable to obtain voluntary compliance from the employer,
the complaint is then referred to the attorney general who prose-
cutes the charge before an administrative hearing board73 established
under the FEP Act.
The Administrative Hearing
Parties
The FEP Acts provide generally that the complaint against the
employer will be prosecuted before the hearing tribunal by the at-
torney general. Obviously the employer and attorney general are
necessary parties. If the statute were exclusively criminal in nature,
no question would arise as to whether or not other interested persons
and orgamzations should be permitted to appear as parties. Regard-
less of how the FEP Acts which provide for administrative hearings
may be characterized, if the employer is found to have discriminated
against the complainant because of his age, the remedy which is
likely to be imposed is a specific order to employ, promote or rehire
the complainant as may be appropriate m the individual case.
Since important financial interests of the complainant are at stake,
justice would seem to dictate that he have the right to appear as a
party at the administrative hearing.7 4 The FEP Acts, however, are
usually silent on whether he may appear as a party or not. 5 In Board
of Educ. v. Commission on Civil Rights, 71' the hearing tribunal per-
1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966); Orm. REy. STAT. §
659.050 (Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 28-6-9 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3) (1965).
73 CoNN. GF-N. STAT. RtV. § 31-127 (1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-8(h) (West
1964); Ona. REv. STAT. § 659.060(2) (Supp. 1965). In other states where adminin-
trative hearings are held, other attorneys, usually employees of the adminnstrative com-
mission, prosecute the complainant's case.
74 Mica. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(7) (Supp. 1965) provides: "the complainant shall
be a party to the proceeding and, in the discretion of a member conducting the hearing
or of the commission, any person may be allowed to intervene therein."
75 MicH. STAT. ANm. § 17.458(7) (Supp. 1965) makes the complainant a party.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-16 (West 1964) and PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964)
both permit the complainant to intervene. ALasxA STAT. § 18.80.135 (Supp. 1966)
permits the complainant to appeal from an order of the commission. The matter is not
mentioned in the statutes of other states. It is clear that the complainant will be a nec-
essary witness at almost all hearings.
76 153 Conn. 162, 220 A.2d 278 (1966). In the absence of a specific statutory pro-
vision, the complainant was permitted to be represented by counsel and take an active
part in the proceedings. This was one of the grounds for appeal. The Supreme Court
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mitted the complainant to appear by counsel at the hearing and take
a very active part in conducting the proceedings. On appeal the Con-
necticut Supreme Court of Errors permitted the attorney for the
complainant to file an Amicus Curiae brief but refused to treat the
complainant as a party or allow hun to participate in the oral argument.
In theory the attorney general in seeking to enforce the statute
adequately represents the interests of the complainant when he prose-
cutes the employer. However, many complainants may suspect the
attorney general of a lack of vigor in investigating and prosecuting
their complaint. Psychologically there is no substitute for being per-
mitted to hire your own attorney and present any evidence you may
have. Aside from the fact that the FEP Acts generally fail to so pro-
vide, there does not appear to be any substantial reason why the
complainant should not be permitted to be a party if he so desires.
Bearing in mind that the administrative hearing tribunal upon a
finding of discrimination is likely to order the employer to give a
certain position to the complainant, it is obvious that there may well
be one or more third parties with personal and financial interests in
the outcome of the hearing at least equal to the interests of the com-
plainant. In Board of Educ. v. Commission on Civil Rights,7 7 the hear-
ing tribunal found that the board of education had discriminated
against the complainant because of his age when he was not selected
for the position of Supervisor of Adult Education. The Connecticut
Civil Rights Commission then ordered that the complainant be em-
ployed in that position with back pay If the case had not been ap-
pealed, the practical effect of this order would have been to require
the City of West Haven to take the position of Supervisor of Adult
Education away from the incumbent holder of the position and give
it to the complainant without the incumbent holder ever having been
heard or afforded the opportunity to present evidence. The statutes
prohibiting discrimination because of age are generally silent as to the
rights of affected third parties to be heard or made parties.7 8
It might be argued that neither the finding of the hearing tribunal
of Errors of the State of Connecticut decided the case on other grounds, but the issue
of whether or not the complainant had a right to be represented by counsel and par-
ticipate was briefed by the appellant, Brief for Appellant, pp. 14-16, the Attorney
General, Brief for the Attorney General, pp. 8-12, and the complainant, Brief for the
Complainant as Amicus Curiae, pp. 10-13.
77 153 Conn. 162, 220 A.2d 278 (1966).
78 But see MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(7) (Supp. 1965), quoted in part in note
74 supra. AxLsn STAT. § 18.80.135(a) (Supp. 1966) provides: "A complainant, or
person against whom a complaint is ified or other person aggrieved by an order of the
commission, may obtain judicial review of the order
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nor the prior voluntary compliance by the employer with the demands
of the administrative agency could affect the contract rights of a third
party holding the position in dispute, but this does not seem correct.
Any contract action instituted by the adversely affected third party
against the employer would be defeated by the defense of impossibility
of performance caused by governmental action.79
If a hearing tribunal has the power to order, in practical effect, that
a position be taken away from a third party, there appears no sub-
stantial reason why the potentially affected third party should not
have the right to appear by counsel and give evidence at the ad-
ministratve hearing which vitally concerns his rights and future."0
Procedure
Procedurally the FEP Acts create no particular difficulties. The
procedure is normally set forth m rather great detail in the acts,81 and
the administrative regulations generally restate in even greater detail
the procedure to be followed.82 Any remaining questions should be
resolved by either the state administrative procedure act or the ad-
ministrative procedure currently practiced in the state.
Evidence of Discrimnation
The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether or not the
complainant was discriminated against because of his age. By statute
79 That is, the performance by the employer has become impracticable because of
the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made; or expressed in another way, the performance of the
employer was frustrated by compliance in good faith with a governmental regulation
of order. See UNrOm CoMERAcL CoDE § 2-615 (defenses in sales contracts); 17
Am. Jun. 2d Contracts § 419 (1964).
80 See Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment (Mo. Pac. R.R.), 348 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1965); Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1959); Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry., 229 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1956). In the Neal
case the court held that employees who might be adversely affected by the action were
indispensable parties. Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment (Mo. Pac. R.R.), supra at 728.
81E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. Rsv. §§ 31-127-28 (Supp. 1965).
82 See, for example, Regulations 371-3 through 371-57 of the Connecticut Com-
mission on Civil Eights. These regulations are reproduced in CCH 1966 EMLOYmENT
PRActicEs GUrDE I1IT 21277-86. Generally, the regulations established by the commis-
sions charged with the enforcement of the FEP Acts are concerned with the procedure
to be followed in processing complaints. They also frequently provide gundelines con-
cermng what questions may be asked a job applicant before and after he is hired and
what may be contained m an advertisement for a position. The CCH Employment Prac-
tices Guide reproduces these guidelines. For a rather extensive collection of guidelines
the reader might consult the rulings of the New York State Commission for Human
Rights found in CCH 1966 E mPLoYMENT PRAcTCnEs GUIDrs fg 26000-150.
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this question is to be resolved after a consideration of all the evi-
dence. 3 What then is evidence of discrimination because of age?
If the tribunal decides that any consideration of age whatever
constitutes a violation of the statute, then the questions of sufficiency
of evidence and burden of proof necessary to sustain a determination
of discrimination will probably be avoided since there will be not only
the complamant's testimony but quite likely some limited admissions
by the employer. However, if the tribunal decides that the statute is
not violated merely because age was considered along with other
factors, then the hearing tribunal is presented with very difficult mixed
questions of fact and law as to what constitutes discrimination because
of age.
At a hearing on the complaint of an individual alleging that he
was discriminated against because of his age and that therefore the
position was given to a younger man, what evidence is likely to be
presented? The attorney general's case will be composed of objective
facts. He will show the respective ages of the candidates, the results of
any tests admimstered by the employer, any interview sheets which
may be in existence and the professional qualifications and experience
of the two men. In meeting the accusation of discrimination, the
employer's case will usually be weak because it will be subjective. He
can only say. "We didn't consider age, or we liked the young man's
personality better, or we thought the job required a more aggressive
personality than the complainant's." If by chance the job was given
to a younger man because of political considerations, family connec-
tions or friends, the firm can hardly admit this fact in a public hearing.
The difference between objective and subjective factors of de-
cision in a courtroom type atmosphere and the stigma which accom-
pames the accusation of discrimination make it very difficult for an
employer to win at an administrative hearing, regardless of whether
he did in fact discriminate in the particular case. While the hearing
tribunal members may wish to be fair, they are, nevertheless, the
Twentieth Century American Inquisition 4 charged with and dedicated
83 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-127 (1962) provides in part: "If, upon all
the evidence, the tribunal finds that a respondent has engaged in any unfair employ-
ment practice, it shall "84In Draper v. Clark Danr, Inc., 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (Super. Ct. 1950), a case
involving racial discrmination, the court said: "Since the proceeding is one in which
the commission prosecutes the complaint before itself as arbiter, it is essentially in-
quisitonal. It lacks the elements of a judicial or quasi-]udicial proceeding in which
parties litigate adverse interests before an impartial tribunal." Id. at 96.
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to stamping out the great social evil of inequality Whatever the rule
of law may be, when a charge of discrimination reaches the hearing
stage, the burden of proof is, in effect, on the employer 5 regardless of
the traditions of jurisprudence.
In arnving at its decision, the hearing tribunal is generally re-
quired to find discrninmation upon a consideration of all the evidence.86
Practically, this means that, barring admissions against interest, the
members of the hearing tribunal must determine on the basis of the
evidence presented at the hearing which of the two candidates they
would have hired. If they, as reasonable men of good judgment, would
have hired the complainant who did not get the position, then the
employer must have discriminated against the complainant because of
his age, unless they decide that the selection was so close that they
should not upset the employer's judgment.
Sanctions Under the FEP Acts
Once it has been established that an employer has discriminated
against a job applicant because of his age, the question of remedy or
punishment arises. There is great diversity among the statutes of the
several states as to the legal consequences of prohibited discrimina-
tion. Some statutes provide no sanctions,87 and others provide only
criminal penalties.8" Most states, however, charge an administrative
85 Contra, Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Coan'n, 34 111. 2d
266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966). In this case the court held that failure of the employer
to provide the Commission with a copy of the applicant's test paper combined with the
applicant's ability to pass the same test when subsequently administered might create
a suspicion of discrimination, but such suspicion was not sufficient grounds on which to
base a remedial order. See also Kovarsky, The Harlequinesque Motorola Decsion and
Its Implications, 7 BoSTON CoLLEE INDUsTRIL. & Cown mcrAL L. REv. 535 (1966).86CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-127 (1962); HAwAII REV. LAWS § 90A-6 (Supp.
1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2323 (1965); MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5
(1965); McE. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(7) (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-17 (West
1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1966); Oim. REv. STAT. §
659.060(4) (Supp. 1965); PENm. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 28-6-12 (1956).
87 CAL. UNEm,. INs. CODE §§ 2070-78; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2318-27 (1965);
MD. Am. CODE art. 100, § 80 (1964); Montana House Joint Resolution No. 12, Laws
of 1961, Omo IEv. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1965); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-14 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REv CODE § 49.44.090 (1962). However, in some of these
states violation of the statutory ban on age discrimination may be puishable under a
catch-all criminal nusdemeanor section, providing for a penalty for all violation of law
for which specific penalties have not otherwise been provided by statute.88 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-11-17 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 713
(Supp. 1964); LA. REv. STAT. § 23:893 (1950); ME. REv. STAT, ANN. tit. 26, § 864
(Supp. 1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1005 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17
(Supp. 1965). -
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agency with enforcement of the act, and a hearing tribunal is gen-
erally empowered to order the employer to take such affirmative ac-
tion as necessary and appropriate to discontinue the violation of the
statute, which may include the hiring of the complainant. 9 Some ad-
mimstrative agencies must petition the regular courts for a court order
enforcing the commission order. 0 If the order of the commission is
affirmed by a regular court in the manner required by local procedure
then it appears that the employer may be held in contempt of court
for failure to obey what is now the order of a regular court.9 A fair
reading of the FEP Acts leads to the conclusion that this is the legis-
lative intent. However, since the acts usually contain a separate sec-
tion making wilful disobedience of an order of the commission a mis-
demeanor punishable by fine and/or unprisonment,92 it may be argued
that this should be the exclusive remedy since it is criminal in nature.
Such an interpretation of the legislative intent seems unsound and
unlikely as it would often make it possible for an employer to pay
a small fee9 3 for the privilege of engaging in unlawful discrimination
and would thereby frustrate the legislative intent of securing employ-
8 9 ALA xA STAT. § 18.80.130 (Supp. 1966); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-127
(1962); HAWAw REv. LAWs § 90A-6 (Supp. 1963); IDAIo CoDE ANN. § 44-1603
(Supp. 1965); MASS. GEN. LA Ws ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (1965); Micu. STAT. ANN. §
17.458(7) (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-17 (West 1964); N.Y. Exxc. LAw §
297(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1966); OFx. Rrv. STAT. § 659.060(4) (Supp. 1965);
PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (Supp. 1964);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-6-12 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3) (1965). Three of
these states also provide a civil remedy to the individual who has been discriminated
against. ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.105 (Supp. 1965); P.R. Lws ANN. tit. 29, § 146(a)
(Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3) (1965). The Wisconsin Statute provides: "Any
person aggrieved by noncompliance with the order shall be entitled to have the same
enforced specifically by suit m equity."
90 ALAsE STAT. § 18.80.135(b) (Supp. 1966); CoNN. GN. STAT. REv. § 31-
128(a) (1962); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 44-1605 (Supp. 1965); MASS. GEN,. LAws ANN.
ch. 151B, § 6 (1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(4) (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:25-19 (West 1964); N.Y. ExEc. LA w § 297(4) (McKinney Supp. 1966); OnE.
REv. STAT. § 659.070 (Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-6-14 (1956).
01 PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43. § 960 (1964) specifically provides for a contempt
order; however, this would appear to be an inherent power of all courts of general
jurisdiction.
92A sx~KA STAT. § 18.80.270 (Supp. 1966); HAwAI REv. LAws § 90A-9 (Supp.
1963); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 44-1606 (Supp. 1965); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 8 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-26 (West 1964); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 299 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1966); OnE. REv. STAT. § 659.990 (Supp. 1965); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 961 (1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146(b) (Supp. 1964).
93 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1005 (Supp. 1965) (provides maximum fine of $10.00);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965) (provides maximum penalty of $25.00 fine
and one day's impnsonment in county ]ail).
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ment for qualified middle-aged workers. It would seem that upon
default of an employer to comply with an order granting the com-
plainant specific relief, the FEP Acts should be construed as per-
mitting the order to be specifically enforced by contempt proceedings
as an alternative to or in addition to any further remedy provided for
in the act. As previously noted, many statutes do not provide for
specific orders to hire.
Appeals
The right to appeal a decision of the administrative hearing tn-
bunal is specifically provided in most FEP Acts which have created
such special proceedings.9 5 Otherwise the normal routes of appeal
are open. After a finding of discrimnation by the hearing tribunal,
the right of appeal to an employer would be of little value. A properly
drafted finding by the hearing tribunal, whether or not based upon
any evidence,96 should almost guarantee that the decision of the hear-
ing tribunal will be upheld on appeal. State lower and supreme courts
rarely upset the findings of administrative tribunals;97 they tend to
reverse only when presented with the crassest examples of abuse of
power or poor judgment by the administrative agencies.
Jurisdiction
There are two possible jurisdictional conflicts. One is between
state and federal tribunals and the other is between different state
tribunals.98
94 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2070-78; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-11-17 (1963);
DEL. CODE ANw. tit. 19, § 713 (Supp. 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 43-2318-27 (1965);
LA. REv. STAT. § 23:893 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. AN. tit. 26, § 864 (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 80 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1005 (Supp. 1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1965);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-14 (Supp. 1966); WAsHr. IEv. CODE § 49.44.909
(1962).
95 E.g., CONN. GEr. STAT. REv. § 31-128 (1962).
96 Attorneys in active practice occasionally find themselves confronted by findings
of fact by a trial judge which they believe are loaded and hardly, if at all, supported
by evidence in the record. They are apt to suspect certain judges of occasionally acting
as advocates for their own decision when drafting their findings. Since the author was
co-counsel for the Board of Education, he must leave it to other unbiased persons to
determine whether or not the findings of fact of the hearing tribunal in Board of Educ.
v. Commssion on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 162, 220 A.2d 278 (1966) were supported
by the evidence presented at the hearing.
97 A recent example of a state supreme court upsetting the findings of an adminis-
trative agency was Board of Educ. v. Commission on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 162, 220
A.2d 278 (1966). See generally 2 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 657 (1962).
98 The complexity of the question of jurisdiction in many of our industries is well
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The State-Federal Conflict
The National Labor Relations Act preempts the field of labor law
at least as to matters falling arguably within the provisions of the
act."' However, it is clear that state labor boards and state courts have
not been ousted by the NLRA from all areas of merely peripheral con-
cern to federal labor law 110
Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Railway Labor
Act prohibit discrimination m employment because of age. However,
under the rationale of the Miranda Fuel Co.1°1 and Hughes Tool Co.102
cases it is possible that the NLRB will find that union discrimmation
because of age constitutes a violation of the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation so as to constitute an unfair labor practice.0 3 While in
isolated individual cases, concurrent jurisdiction may exist between
the NLRB and state agencies charged with the enforcement of FEP
Acts, m general unfair employment practices will be readily distin-
guishable from unfair labor practices. It would seem that in the oc-
casional case involving concurrent jurisdiction, the NLBB might well
cede ]urisdiction to a state civil rights commission when it appears
that the main thrust of the complaint is discrimiation because of age.
illustrated by Allegheny Airlines v. Fowler, CCH 1966 EMLOYMENT PRAcICEs GUIDE
ft 9031 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1966). The plaintiff airlines brought a declaratory judgment
action in the federal court to declare that the New York State Commission for Human
Rights was without jurisdiction to apply the age provisions of the New York law against
discrination to the plaintiffs' stewardesses. The federal court dismissed the action be-
cause the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, but the junsdic-
tional difficulty is illustrated by the following facts: most of the airlines are foreign
corporations, and all of the airlines are engaged in interstate commerce; the airlines are
required to employ flight attendants or stewardesses, and each airline has determined
that youth is an occupational qualification for flight stewardesses; each airline employs
stewardesses who perform services within the state, but all stewardesses are hired to
perform services in interstate or foreign air transportation; most of the airlines have
stewardess bases in New York and other bases outside the state, but most stewardesses
are initially hired outside of New York and the majority of those assigned to New York
bases perform most of their services outside New York; there are laws against discrmi-
nation in employment in twenty states (including New York) serviced by the airlines,
with a range of different protected ages.
99 Marine Engrs. Beneficial Ass'n. v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962); In re
Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962) (dictum).
100 See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962); International Ass'n. of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
101 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959).
102 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
103 See Fuchs & Ellis, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on the National Labor
Relations Board, 7 BOSTON COLLEGE INDusTRIAL. & CoimmcmAL L. REv. 575, 597-600
(1966); Molinar, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 7 BosToN"-
CoLLEcE INsusTrTA & CommmalAL L. REv. 601 (1966).
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However, it also would seem that whenever the NLRB may reasonably
be thought to have jurisdiction, an affirnative decision by the NLRB to
cede jurisdiction is necessary 0 4 In this regard the holding in Walker
Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commrn 0 5 that there was no federal preemp-
tion in a case involving discrimination in employment because of age
may be justified since it did not appear in that case that it was rea-
sonably arguable that the NLRA was applicable.106 When an employer
discriminates against an individual because of union activity but
alleges that the reason for its conduct was the age of the individual,
the NLRB should have jurisdiction.' 07
The Intrastate Tribunal Conflict
There are two possible jurisdictional conflicts within the state.
The first is between the state labor board and the regular courts, and
the second is between the state labor board and the civil rights com-
mission in those states which have established separate commissions
to enforce the FEP Acts.
In those states which do not have a separate civil rights com-
mission, it will be a question of statutory interpretation as to whether
the state labor board may assert jurisdiction over discrimination in
employment because of age. If the board is found to have jurisdic-
tion, it would seem that such jurisdiction should be exclusive.
In those states which have established separate civil rights com-
missions to enforce the FEP Acts, there should be no question as to the
authority of the commission to enforce the acts. Whether their juns-
diction is exclusive might depend upon the type of dispute involved.
To date the greatest number of disputes and the greatest number of
administrative regulations under the acts concern discrimination dur-
ing the hiring process. 0 8 If the refusal to hire is based solely upon
104 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
105 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
10 6 See San Diego Bldg. Umon v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Local 24, Intl
Bhd. of Teamsters Umon v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Klotz v. Watham, 31 Wis. 2d
19, 142 N.W.2d 197 (1966). See generally Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the
States in Shaping Labor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 411. See also Purdy, Title
VII: Relationship and Effect on State Action, 7 BosToN CoLLEGE ImwusuA & Com-
mzRCrAL L. Ry. 525 (1966) where the author discusses section 706 of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides for the invocation of state or local law pro-
hibiting an unlawful employment practice where such laws exist.
10 7 See Sardis Luggage Co. v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1956); Tide-
water Iron & Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 624, 632 (1938).
108 For example see the New York State Commission Against Discrimination regula-
tions reproduced in CCH 1966 EMLoYMNT PnAcTcEs GumnE 11 26050 (Rulings on
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age, there may be a jurisdictional conflict between the civil rights com-
mission and the state labor board, but as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, it would seem that the civil rights commission should have
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state labor board. When an alleged
act of discrimination occurs during the employment of an individual
or when an alleged discriminatory discharge occurs, the conduct of
the employer is likely to be a violation of a provision in the employer's
contract with a union1i 9 as well as a violation of the FEP Act. The
regulation of the employer-employee relationship is generally in the
hands of an executive-administrative agency11° (i.e. state labor board),
whereas the FEP Act is generally administered by the state's civil
rights commission.1 11 Thus there are potential jurisdictional conflicts
in cases dealing with the employment relationship as well as in those
dealing with the hiring process.
It seems unfortunate that the FEP Acts which prohibit discrimia-
tion in employment set up a separate administrative agency to ac-
complish this task. The consequence is that the state law governing
the legal relations of employers, unions, and employees is regulated by
two state administrative agencies,112 one with a general subject matter
jurisdiction over labor matters and one with a specific subject matter
Pre-Employment), 26051 (Pre-Employment Inquiries), 26052 (Rulings Interpreting
'Age' Provisions).
109 See CCH 1966 EPLOYiENT PR&CniCEs GUImE fff 8066, 8081.
11oProfessor Kovarsky raises the interesting spectrum of possible conflicts between
the executive and the legislative branches of the government under the federal Civil
Rights Act where, by executive order, certain employment practices are required of
parties contracting with the federal government. The same problem could arise on the
state and local level. Kovarsky, The Harlequtnesque Motorola Decision and its Impli-
cations, 7 BosToN COLLEGE INrusTRAL & Coummimcr L. REv. 535, 545-47 (1966).
As pointed out by Manning and Domesick, Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319
(1966) does not apply to discrimination because of age. Manning & Domesick, Title
VII: Relationship and Effect on Executive Order No. 11246, 7 BOSTON COLLEGE INDus-
TwA. & COmrmmcrAL L. REv. 561 (1966). However, Executive Order 11114, 28 Fed. Reg.
6485 (1963) declares it to be against federal public policy for parties contracting with
the government to discriminate in employment because of age. See CCH 1966 EMPLoY-
3MnNT PRAcTic s Guam ff 2002 (CCH 1966 Employment Practices Gide gives incorrect
executive order number).
111 E.g., Nim. REv. STAT. § 48-1116 (Supp. 1965) establishes an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.112 This dual regulation raises a number of questions. Do the FEP Acts preempt the
field of labor law from the jurisdiction of state labor boards? Should they? If the FEP Act
concurrently regulates a labor dispute, may the complainant elect between pursuing Ins
remedies under the FEP Act or under general labor law? Or must one route toward a
remedy be exhausted before the other may be pursued? If so, which one? In Neal v.
System Bd. of Adjustment (Mo. Pac. R.R.), 348 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1965) the court held
that internal uion remedies must be exhausted as a pre-requisite to relief in the federal
courts.
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jurisdiction over civil rights questions in the employment relationship.
Needless conflicts, confusion, and expense to the state and all citizens
can be the only result of tis unfortunate division of admimstrative
competence. When positive relief rather than a criminal penalty is
the available remedy, the enforcement of a statute prohibiting dis-
crimiation in employment should be left to the agency charged with
the adminstration of the state's substantive labor law rather than a
separate administrative agency (i.e. a civil rights commission).
Technical Evaluation of Existing FEP Acts
In this section it will be assumed that it is a wise and desirable
social policy to prohibit discrimiation in employment because of
middle age. As discussed above two distinct approaches have been
taken by the statutes: some statutes merely impose criminal sanctions;
other statutes create administrative agencies charged with the task
of investigating alleged acts of discrimination and compelling the
employer not to discriminate in a particular case by an order granting
the complainant affirmative relief.
It is understandable that a separate administrative agency charged
with the special tasks of eliminating discrmnmation and with the
necessity of justifying its own existence and budget may display more
vigor and energy in enforcing an FEP Act than a state attorney How-
ever, the machinery of the law only comes into operation under either
system when an individual files a complaint with the appropriate
public official."'s Hence one should not assume that an administrative
agency will automatically be much more efficient in eliminating dis-
crimiation than the state attorney
Criminal Sanction vs. Specific Order
Criminal sanctions may be as severe" 4 or light"l5 as the legislature
deem-s appropriate. There is no reason why a criminal statute which
imposes a heavy penalty and which is vigorously enforced cannot be
just as effective in eliminating discrimination in employment as specific
13 E.g., ALASjA STAT. § 18.80.100 (Supp. 1966).
"4 E.g., LA. BRE. STAT. § 23:893 (1950) provides: "Whoever violates the provisions
of this section shall be fined no more than five hundred dollars or mprisoned for not more
than ninety days, or both."
15 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (Supp. 1965) provides: "Any person or corpo-
ration who violates any of the provisions of this preceding section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed twenty-five dollars or by
imprisonment in the county jail for not to exceed one day or by both such fine and ia-
pnsonment."
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orders to cease and desist from discrimination under the statutes which
authorize such orders. However, while criminal sanctions against an
employer may eliminate prospective discrimination, they will not ob-
tam a position for the person discriminated against in the case in
question. This can be accomplished only under statutes which permit
orders to eliminate the discriminatory practices against an individual.
We live in an age which believes in positive government, and in
a society where the personal relationship between the employer and
employee has largely disappeared. Nevertheless, whether an employer
should be compelled to hire, promote, or rehire an individual when
the employer has previously decided to do the contrary is a difficult
social ]udgment.
Under those statutes which permit positive relief to the complain-
ant, there is a shifting of the ultimate power to hire, fire, or promote
from private individuals to a governmental administrative agency
In order to determine whether the alleged discrimiation actually
occurred, the administrative agency must decide de novo whether an
individual should have been hired, fired, or promoted. This decision
has most senous implications for freedom in our society, particularly
in those firms where ownership has not yet been divorced from man-
agement. The social desirability of such strong arm procedures should
be considered. For centuries it has been basic law that an employ-
ment contract will not be specifically enforced."" The courts have
regarded it as against public policy to require an employer to keep
an employee whom the employer does not want.ii? Freedom of associa-
tion has been recognized as a value to be protected in society How-
ever, the traditional policy arguments against the specific enforcement
of employment contracts have lost much of their force in recent years.
Under today's labor law it is not infrequent to find that an employer
loses his right to discharge an employee without cause," 8 and in
many cases the employer has been forced to re-employ discharged
employees. 11
The employer has an interest in those who work for him, and that
is why the employer will usually screen applicants by some hring
116 See 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 82 (1953); 49 Am. JuR. Specific Perfor-
mance § 135 (1943).
n7 In Feich v. Findlay College, 119 Ohio App. 357, 200 N.E.2d 353 (1963) the
court refused to grant a faculty member specific performance of his employment contract
with the college.
118 See generally 31 Am. Jun. Labor §§ 133, 209, 301, 305 (1958).
119 E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLEB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v.
MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); New York State Labor Relations Bd. v.
Toffenetti Restaurant Co., 180 Misc. 326, 44 N.Y.S.2d 798, (1943).
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procedure. When an employer is forced to hire an individual after
the employer refused to hre that individual even when threatened
with an administrative hearing and was willing to spend the money
in attorneys' fees necessary to fight hiring the particular individual,
it is hard to believe that there will be no smoldering bitterness on
either side and that a relationship of mutual trust and confidence,
which is so necessary to the employee's proper performance of his
job, will spring up between the employer and the employee. On the
contrary, such a compelled relationship between the employer and the
new employee is bound to be strained. It may even infect the at-
mosphere of the entire firm and cause a deterioration in the morale of
other employees.
At first glance it would appear to be advantageous to the middle-
aged worker to reqmre the employer guilty of discrimination to hre
him. But is it really to the advantage of the middle aged worker to be
hired with the sheriff behind him? Not likely, unless the sheriff were
to remain there constantly Not only does the new employee face the
prospect of unpleasant tasks, but his chances for future advancement
with that employer are virtually nil, and raises are highly unlikely
Of course, such acts by the employer might well constitute further
violations of the Fair Employment Practice Act, but proof of dis-
crimmation is likely to be more difficult. Furthermore, the worker
who constantly complains either to the state administrative agency
charged with the enforcement of the FEP Act or to his umon grievance
committee is unlikely to obtain either sympathy or relief.
It would seem that in the long run orders to hire, promote or re-
hire a given worker against the wishes of the employer are probably
against the public interest. Our courts have traditionally recognized
this in refusing to grant specific enforcement of personal service con-
tracts. While large corporations are frequently impersonal in many
matters of personnel policy, even in large corporations the relation-
ship between an employee and his supervisor is highly personal and
subject to all the vagaries of human emotion. Even here a forced re-
lationship is likely to be contrary to the best long-term interest of an
aggrieved middle-aged worker. It seems quite probable that FEP Acts
which provide for specific orders to hire, promote, or rehire are ill-
advised and contrary to enlightened public policy
Scope of Statute
After it is determined whether a statute prohibiting discrimination
in employment because of age is criminal in nature or permits positive
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relief against discrinination, the breadth of coverage of the statute
must be determined. Most of the statutes which permit positive relief
are the result of placing age along with race, religion, color, etc., in a
general civil rights statute prohibiting discrimination in employment.'"2
However, the states which have enacted this type of statute have failed
to recognize that there are vast social, economic, political, psychological
and qualitative differences between discrimination in employment
because of middle age and discrimmation in employment because of
race, religion, etc. The social results of discrmination based upon race
differ from the social results of discrimination based upon age. There
are rarely any rational reasons for discrimination because of race
whereas there are situations in which discrimination based upon age
is both economically and socially justifiable. 12' Hence it is structurally
preferable to make discrnnmination in employment because of age un-
lawful under a separate statutory section 22 rather than to merely add
age to the types of discrimination banned by the general civil rights'
statute. This is so because different exemptions and exclusions are
appropriate in statutes banning discrimination in employment because
of age than are appropriate in statutes banning discrimination in em-
ployment because of race, color, religious creed, national origin or
ancestry 2I When the same statute covers both age and race, religion,
etc., illogical and unjustifiable exclusions may result. For instance,
the exclusion for domestic servants and religious, fraternal and chari-
table organizations, as previously discussed, may be appropriate when
the reason for the discrimination is race or religion but not when it is
age.
Conclusion
Only a bare majority of the states have passed legislation pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment because of age; and so far the
federal government has declined to pass such legislation. Hence the
question of whether or not it is enlightened public policy to prohibit
discrimination in employment because of age remains open.
Why do people discriminate against workers of nddle or advanced
age? There are two basic reasons: one resulting from physical age,
and one resulting from the by-product of present day employment
contracts and social legislation.
120 Note 24 supra and accompanying text.
121 See text at note 57 supra.
12 2 See statutes listed in note 12 supra.
1 3 See text at notes 62, 63 supra.
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While there is no direct mathematical relationship between age
and the physical and mental attributes of a man, there is enough of a
relationship between these two factors to make age a reliable basis
for predicting the qualities of an individual. Youth is the time of
physical strength, energy, idealism, and flexibility Advancing age
brings with it a decline in physical strength and energy and often a
disappearance of idealism and flexibility; but it also brings with it
experience, mature judgment and a wider circle of acquaintanceships.
Thus, there are quality differences between the older, middle-aged
worker and the young worker. For one job an employer might want the
qualities of a young man, and for another job the same employer
might want the qualities of an older man. It should be obvious that
most employers would want a younger man for a body guard and an
older man for a chief auditor.
Another reason why an employer might prefer a younger worker
is to create or preserve an age balance and spread among ns em-
ployees. Today employers are largely corporate entities of indeter-
minate life. Any orgamzation which becomes overloaded with middle-
aged or older employees will find itself in trouble. There will be no
youthful energy to balance the caution and conservatism of the older
employees. This can lead to serious loss of business to younger more
aggressive competitors. Then too, the day of nature's reckoning is
just around the corner. If there is an insufficient age spread in a firm,
within a brief period of tme most of the firm's key personnel will
retire; and there will be an insufficient number of younger and middle-
aged men of sufficient experience to carry on the same quality of
operation. This is why most large firms and many smaller ones have
executive training programs. These firms deliberately recruit younger
men and tram and advance them over the years in order to have good
experienced replacements familiar with the firm's business ready to
step into the shoes of older employees as they retire.
There is a catch in the logic behind the well intentioned FEP
Acts, particularly as they concern discrimiation in employment be-
cause of age. A full utilization of workers in our society depends upon
a full employment economy, an economy which we have generally not
enjoyed except in times of war. In any economy, other than a flal em-
ployment economy, some workers must be out of work; the question,
then, is which workers. Further complicating the situation is the fact
that the number of persons seeking employment expands and contracts
considerably depending upon social, economic and other factors.
In our present society everyone has a right to a imminum standard
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of living. Those who are out of work are supported by those who are
working. Tis is true whether the unemployed are over or under 40
years of age. Laws banning discrimiation against middle-aged and
older workers do not create more jobs. They merely reallocate among
the various age groups the lobs available in society. This fundamental
fact was apparently not given the consideration it deserved when
state legislatures passed statutes prohibiting discrimunation in employ-
ment because of age.
The real solution to the social evils which accompany unemploy-
ment lies not so much in legislation prohibiting discrunnation in
employment as in positive legislation creating new, productive jobs
for the unemployed regardless of their age, race, color, creed or na-
tional origin. Recogmzmg the social problems which accompany unem-
ployment and likewise all the useful work there remains to be done
m our society, it would seem that our government should recognize
that it has a duty to supply employment for its citizens.12 We might
begin with the river control projects, the subway construction and the
many other useful projects which are needed in our country Such
projects would largely eliminate the necessity of fair employment
practice acts. A full employment economy would turn the labor market
from a buyer's into a seller's market.
In our present society, with its high rate of unemployment until
quite recently, serious consideration should be given to whether it is
in the public interest to prohibit discrimiation because of age. Such
prohibition merely increases the employment of older persons and
limits the number of jobs available to the younger members of our
society. Since most FEP Acts only make discrimination against workers
between 40 and 65 unlawful,2 5 this must necessarily increase unem-
124 The Russian Constitution guarantees every citizen of the Soviet Umon the right
to work. It is the duty of the government to find or create a job for every individual.
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 12 (Foreign Languages Publishing House 1962) provides: 'ork
in the U.S.S.R. is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accor-
dance with the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat.' The principle
applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: 'From each according to ins ability, to each
according to Ins work."' U.S.S.R. CoNsT. art. 118 provides: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have
the right to work, that is, the right to guaranteed employment and payment for their work
in accordance with its quantity and quality. The right to work is ensured by the socialist
organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet
society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unem-
ployment."
1 t5 CAL. UNEmp. INs. CoDE § 2072 (ages 40-64); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-122
(1962) (ages 40-65); INn. ANN. STAT. § 40-2318 (1965) (ages 40-65); Mn. ANN. CoDE
art. 100, § 79(d) (1965) (ages 40-65); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (1965)
(ages 45-65); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3a) (Supp. 1965) (ages 35-60); Montana
House Joint Resolution No. 12, Laws of 1961 (ages 40-65); N.D. CENT. CoDE: § 34-01-17
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ployment among those under 40, and these are the members of our
society who are raising young families and who are without any
appreciable accumulation of savings.
The author is not certain whether in the long run legislation pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment because of age is in the best
interest of society He inclines toward the belief that it is not. It is a
question upon which reasonable men may certainly differ after con-
siderable thought. However, he believes that in many instances in-
sufficient consideration has been given to the long term social and
economic effects of this legislation. If legislation there must be, he is
inclined to believe that it should be purely criminal in nature. If an
administrative agency is to be charged with the enforcement of the
statute, it should preferably be the state admimstrative agency with
general supervisory power over all labor matters and not a specialized
civil rights commission.
(Supp. 1965) (ages 40-65); Omio REv. CODE Aw. § 4101.17 (1965) (ages 40-65);
PENN. STAT. ANw. tit. 43, § 954(h) (1964) (ages 40-62); R.I. GE:N. LAws ANN. § 28-6-1
(Supp. 1965) (ages 45-65); WAsH. R-v. CODE § 49.44.090 (1962) (ages 40-65); Wis.
STAT. § 111.32(5) b (1965) (ages 40-65).
